UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA CHARLOTTE DIVISION

LA MICHOACANA NATURAL, LLC,) DOCKET NO. 3:17-cv-727
Plaintiff,)
VS.)
LUIS MAESTRE, et al,)
Defendants.))

TRANSCRIPT OF MOTIONS HEARING
BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT J. CONRAD, JR
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
MARCH 3, 2020

APPEARANCES:

On Behalf of the Plaintiff:

STEPHEN LEE ANDERSON, ESQ., Anderson & Associates 31285 Temecula Parkway, Suite 240 Temecula, California 92592

ALBERT P. ALLAN, ESQ., Allan Law Firm, PLLC 409 East Boulevard, Suite 201 Charlotte, North Carolina 28203

On Behalf of the Defendant Maestre:

LAURA L. CHAPMAN, ESQ., Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton, LLP Four Embarcadero Center, 17th Floor San Francisco, California 94111

MATTHEW S. DeANTONIO, ESQ., Bradley Arant Boult Cummings 214 N. Tryon Street, Suite 3700 Charlotte, North Carolina 28202

LAURA ANDERSEN, RMR
Official Court Reporter
United States District Court
Charlotte, North Carolina

1		INDE	X	DACE:
2	DEFENDANT WITNESS:			<u>PAGE</u>
3	LUIS MAESTRE Direct Examination B Cross-Examination By	y Ms. Chapmai Mr. Andersoi	n n	52 58
4	1	* * * * *		
5		EXHIBI	- т с	
6	Plaintiff'S EXHIBIT:	<u>E A II I D I</u>		7
7	<u>NUMBER</u> 1	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	: • • • • • • • • • • • •	<u>ADMITTED</u> 6
8		* * * * *	* *	
9	ALSO PRESENT:			
10	MICHEAL CORTEZ Certified Interpreter			
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				
16				
17				
18				
19				
20				
21				
22				
23				
24				
25				
	Case 3:17-cv-00727-RJC-DCK	Document 128	Filed 03/04/20	Page 2 of 73

PROCEEDINGS

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 4, 2020:

(Court called to order at 10:00.)

THE COURT: Good morning, everyone.

ALL COUNSEL: Good morning, Your Honor.

THE COURT: We're here in the matter of La

Michoacana v Luis Maestre, et al, on Defendant's Omnibus

Motion for Relief from Summary Judgment, Request to Strike

Answer and Counterclaim, Request to Dissolve the Preliminary

Injunction, to Revoke Plaintiff Counsel's Pro Hac Vice

Admission, and for Sanctions.

Are the parties ready to proceed?

MS. CHAPMAN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Would the attorneys introduce themselves, tell me who you are representing.

MR. DeANTONIO: Thank you, Your Honor.

My name is Matt DeAntonio with the Bradley firm here in Charlotte. With me today is my co-counsel Laura Chapman from Sheppard Mullin, and we represent the Defendants.

This is our motion. And also with us today is our client Mr. Luis Maestre and his wife Ms. Adriana Teran Maestre.

Because Mr. Maestre, his primary language is Spanish, we've asked for an interpreter to be here today so that he can understand today's proceedings. Mr. Micheal

Cortez is here, and he's already been sworn in by the clerk. 1 2 THE COURT: Thank you. 3 MS. CHAPMAN: Thank you. 4 Albert Allan on behalf of La Michoacana, MR. ALLAN: 5 and Mr. Anderson is also here on behalf of La Michoacana, and the client is also here, Your Honor. 6 7 THE COURT: Thank you. 8 Mr. DeAntonio, Ms. Chapman, it is your motion. 9 will be glad to hear from you. 10 MS. CHAPMAN: Yes. Thank you very much, Your Honor. 11 We appreciate that you set this for a hearing. 12 As you know, this is a motion primarily to vacate 13 the Summary Judgment Order. And the transcript on the hearing 14 at the summary judgment motion indicates that the Court had 15 asked questions about whether the Defendants had responded to 16 discovery. 17 The unequivocal answer to that question is, yes. 18 The Defendants responded to discovery. 19 And we have prepared, if Your Honor would like to 20 see it, a demonstrative cited to the record that shows all of 21 the discovery requests and all of the discovery responses. 22 THE COURT: I was particularly interested in the 23 hearing and, as my subsequent order reflects, the question of the request to admit. Because I had in my mind from the 24

pleadings and that hearing that there had been no answer to

25

```
the request to admit. I took them as admitted --
 1
 2
               MS. CHAPMAN:
                             Yes.
 3
               THE COURT: -- for failure to respond.
 4
               And so that is the particular area of interest that
 5
    the Court has.
 6
               MS. CHAPMAN: Yes, Your Honor. So therefore you
 7
    will not need the demonstrative and --
 8
               THE COURT: I don't know.
 9
              MS. CHAPMAN: Oh, well, that is certainly included.
10
     If we may approach and show you.
11
               THE COURT: You may.
12
              MR. ANDERSON: I have not been -- we have not been
13
    provided a copy.
                              I have a copy for you.
14
              MR. DEANTONIO:
15
               THE COURT: So, Mr. Anderson, this occurred the
16
     first time. When you address the Court, it is the custom in
    this district for you to stand and indicate to me what you are
17
18
    requesting.
19
              And so you were talking there, and I don't think I
    heard you. What --
20
21
              MR. ANDERSON: I just indicated we had not gotten a
22
    copy of what she was proffering to the Court.
23
               THE COURT: Very well.
24
               You have now?
25
              MR. ANDERSON: They just handed it to me. I haven't
```

had a chance to look at it.

THE COURT: So this demonstrative let's, for the record, refer to that as Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1 was received into evidence.)

MS. CHAPMAN: Yes, Your Honor.

As Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 indicates, the Defendants responded to the discovery that was propounded by the Plaintiff. This is fairly self-explanatory. Each document at issue is in the left-hand column. The dates that the documents were served are in the middle, and the dates that the Defendants provided response are in the right-hand column.

Every highlighted statement in yellow reflects the fact that at the time that document was either served or responded to the Defendants were representing themselves.

Despite that fact, they did respond to everything.

And Your Honor specifically was interested in the response to the Plaintiff's First Set of Request for Admissions to Luis Maestre. Those are middle way down the page. In gray background it says "Plaintiff's First RFAs to Luis Maestre." They were served on June 15, 2018. That's indicated in the court's docket 116-9.

And the responses to those were served several days late, but they were served on July 23, 2018.

THE COURT: My recollection is that the due date was

July 18th.

MS. CHARMAN: I believe that is correct, Your Honor. And, like I said, they were several days late and that is why in our motion we cited cases that allow the Court in its discretion to relieve a party of a late — file a late-served request for admission.

That argument that we made was not responded to by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff did not refute any of our cases. And our position as we stated in our reply brief is that as a result that argument has been waived, and we would respectfully request that the Court allow those late-served responses to the request for admissions.

Particularly because those responses provide a defense, a meritorious defense to the case for claim of trademark infringement.

This case has one — essentially one material fact that's at issue, which is who had priority of use of the marks in the Charlotte, North Carolina, metropolitan market area?

And the answer to that is the Defendants did. And that fact is not disputed.

The Plaintiff provided an opposition to our motion. Plaintiff asked for some additional time. You granted the time, and the Court approved that.

And nowhere in the Plaintiff's opposition to the motion here today does the Plaintiff contest that the priority

is with the Defendants.

And we submitted many declarations, several declarations that attest to the fact that the Defendants have priority.

In a Rule 60 motion we have to be timely, which is within a year. We have to show a meritorious defense, which according to the case law does not require that much. And we have met it because we have priority. And we have to show that there would be no unfair prejudice.

When we look at the summary judgment order that the Court issued, which is document 78, which was filed on June 6, 2019, Footnote 1 is really indicative of what we're here today on is to show that there really is a pattern and practice that relates to Footnote 1.

In Footnote 1, as the Court references what had happened at the summary judgment hearing in terms of some documents that were provided, and the Court explained that the Court was startled and baffled to find out that the documents that were provided by the Defendant to the Plaintiff contained relevant responsive information that the Plaintiff's counsel had said at the hearing on the summary judgment motion were not responsive.

This situation is really the same thing with respect to the request for admissions.

The request for admissions were served. Mr --

Plaintiff's counsel Mr. Anderson had filed a sworn declaration with the Court, which is document 31-1 at paragraph 10. And in that declaration, which all of this is in our papers, he acknowledged receipt of the responses to the request for admissions. And he acknowledged that he had received them on July 23, 2018, again, that's in docket 31 and 31-1 at paragraph 10. He did that at the time that he was asking to compel other discovery responses.

And as time passed, then the narrative around these discovery responses changed, and then he began to say he did not receive them.

He did receive them. He swore under oath he received them.

Somewhat concerning is that after — after the Court publishes the summary judgment order where the Court explains that the Court is startled and baffled, one would expect, I believe, under the governing applicable rules that Plaintiff's counsel would inform the Court, I have found — after looking through my records I do see the responses to request for admissions. But that did not happen.

And what we see in the opposition to this motion I believe is a clear intention by the Plaintiff and its counsel to have made that --

THE COURT: I don't think you were here at the hearing which triggered the footnote you're talking about.

1 2

At that hearing counsel for the Plaintiff said different things. One part of the hearing he said, "Frankly, I did not even open it or look at it because we already had motions for summary judgment pending."

At a subsequent part of the hearing he indicates, "I misspoke. I didn't say I didn't read it. It's just that it didn't make sense. They weren't responsive."

And then subsequent to the hearing I directed counsel to file the package that he did receive.

And so that's all before me, the very inconsistent statements of counsel at the hearing and then my own perusal of the package that was filed.

So what more did you expect him to say?

MS. CHAPMAN: I think that what we have here at issue is a set of request for admissions that in response to --

THE COURT: You're talking about which, the first or the second?

MS. CHAPMAN: Yes, Your Honor. I hear what you are saying about the Footnote 1 in the Court's order. And if I may, if it's acceptable, I think I would just like to go back to really exactly what we have at issue here, which is the request for admissions, and the fact that they were served on July 23, 2018, almost a year before the summary judgment motion was considered in this case, and the fact that there

was a sworn acknowledgment in document 31-1 by the Plaintiff's counsel that he had received them.

And the fact that my comment which may not be helpful to the Court is that, I think, once you receive the summary judgment order at that point you know for certain that the Court is basing its entire summary judgment decision on the mistaken understanding that no responses to the RFAs had been served.

Once you see that, at a very bear bones minimum, I believe you would have an obligation to contact the Court and to correct the record and to inform the Court that the entirety of the basis of the summary judgment is factually incorrect.

And when we look at the response to request for admission 36, we see that summary judgment could not or should not have been granted. Because in the response to request for admission 36, the defense explains he had been using the mark "La Michoacana" and "La Linda Michoacana" since 2008. And that is priority of use and that is a meritorious defense.

THE COURT: So walk me through that. Where is that found?

MS. CHAPMAN: The response to -- this is in our chart, Your Honor, it is docket 115-10, page 4 of 5 on docket 115-10.

THE COURT: Go ahead and tell me what it says.

MS. CHAPMAN: At the very bottom it says: 1 2 "Denied. I have been using the name La Michoacana 3 since 2008." 4 That prohibits summary judgment and Plaintiff knew 5 that. 6 The request is on document 116-9, page 8 of 14. 7 request number 36 states: 8 "Admit that you used the trademark 'La Michoacana' 9 in connection with ice cream in order to confuse the 10 purchasing public regarding any affiliation, sponsorship, or 11 other association to Plaintiff." 12 The response to that again is: "Denied. I have 13 been using the name La Michoacana since 2008." 14 THE COURT: All right. 15 MS. CHAPMAN: That prohibits summary judgment and 16 that the Plaintiff had the burden on summary judgment and 17 attempted and successfully attempted to meet that burden by 18 making the false statement that the responses to the first 19 request -- first set of admissions had not been served. 20 So to some extent this is a fairly straightforward 21 situation, and at a minimum it is a mistake that qualifies 22 under Rule 60(b) to vacate the summary judgment order. 23 It is our contention that the evidence that exists 24 in the case mandates summary judgment be granted in favor of 25 the Defendants because there is no disputed fact on the issue of priority use. There is nothing in the opposition that disputes the evidence that we have provided.

So we ask for vacating the current summary judgment order and entry of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.

THE COURT: All right. Do you wish to speak to the other requests for relief?

MS. CHAPMAN: Yes.

It appears to us that this a situation in which a material, knowing, false statement was made to the Court on repeated occasions.

And as I said, at a minimum, by the time the summary judgment order got granted, at a minimum, there should have been an effort to explain that was incorrect.

But even before then there were numerous false statements about the lack of the RFAs having been served. It was repeated. And what we can see in the opposition to this motion, the opposition doesn't say "I made a mistake. It was an oversight. I did not realize at the time of the hearing that I had those responses."

That is not the Defendant's — the Plaintiff's position.

The Plaintiff's position is that it was justified in telling the Court a misstatement. And it does not seem that that could possibly be true. It cannot possibly be that any of the excuses amount to permission to have made a misstatement to the Court on a repeated basis.

Because of that, and because of the acts of intimidation and — frankly, this is — this appears to be somewhat extreme. I have not, you know, the act of intimidating a witness, going to her place of business, threatening to burn down the restaurant with her inside of it, making the obscene gesture, threatening the Defendants with arrest, demanding that they show their identification when they are in the courthouse, and photographing it, plus those repeated misrepresentations, plus the refusal to acknowledge that what had happened and what had been done was incorrect and wrong, seems to justify revoking the Pro Hac Vice admission, and we do request that.

THE COURT: You have filed an affidavit setting forth a very disturbing set of — or disturbing conduct on the behalf of Plaintiff's counsel the day before the preliminary injunction hearing which if true would give this Court great pause, great concern. And Mr. Anderson has filed response indicating a different version of events.

And so how does this Court determine the truth of that matter?

MS. CHAPMAN: I believe that there are two — there are two things that the Court can do to assess credibility.

I think one thing the Court can do is look at the

photograph that is included in one of the declarations to see that that behavior is more consistent with a threat. It is not consistent with what Mr. Anderson is saying.

And the police report, I mean, these folks filed a police report.

THE COURT: Who filed a police report?

MS. CHAPMAN: The — I believe it was Talmeda Mendoza, the woman who owns the restaurant. I think she was the one who contacted the police, not the employee who was actually threatened. I may be incorrect on that point.

But the employee who was threatened, Your Honor, she quit her job. That's a — that reflects — and she said that under oath. That reflects fear, and you're going to be afraid when someone threatens to burn the place down with you inside.

So I'm not really here to prove the case, I think, as to you know whether, you know, this is a professional member of the bar. I'm a member of the bar. But I do feel that the behavior is — even the misrepresentations, the repeated misrepresentations —

THE COURT: Well, from your comments you're relying upon the affidavit. I guess I should construe from that that I would not have the opportunity to hear that evidence firsthand.

MS. CHAPMAN: If the Court saw fit to have those witnesses come in and testify to it, that could be done,

presumably. 1 2 THE COURT: But you're not prepared to do that 3 today? 4 MS. CHAPMAN: I am not prepared to do that today, 5 Your Honor. 6 THE COURT: All right. 7 Anything else on? 8 MS. CHAPMAN: We would also request the sanctions in 9 the form of what it costs to bring this motion that we could provide information about to the Court. 10 11 And when the -- if the Court sees fit to vacate the 12 summary judgment order, the domain names that were included in 13 the summary judgment order should be reversed back to the Defendant. That's in the summary judgment order, I just 14 15 wanted to be clear. 16 THE COURT: How would the Court do that? 17 MS. CHAPMAN: Just put it in the order that -- you 18 are requiring the Plaintiff to transfer them back. And then 19 the Plaintiff will have to take the steps to transfer them 20 back. 21 Mr. Maestre transferred the domain names in 22 accordance with the Court's summary judgment order. 23 THE COURT: Right. 24 MS. CHAPMAN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

25

1 MS. CHAPMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Mr. Anderson, glad to hear from you. 3 MR. ANDERSON: Good morning, Your Honor. 4 Well, that was a grab bag of information I would 5 like to address. I'll start with the sanctions and costs. 6 THE COURT: Well, no, don't start there. Start with 7 the substance. Let's start about --8 MR. ANDERSON: Well, that was the last thing she 9 said, I was just --10 THE COURT: You should be interested in what the Court's interested in. And the Court is interested in the 11 12 substantive. 13 MR. ANDERSON: Oh, first and foremost I have to say 14 that I am embarrassed. I embarrassed myself. I embarrassed 15 my co-counsel. I embarrassed my client by flipping the finger 16 at an employee. But the back story to that is quite important 17 in that -- I'm sorry. 18 Yes, and again, we can get to that. But the most 19 important thing we need to address, as co-counsel just pointed 20 out, is the request for admissions question. 21 And again, by no means did I misstate the fact that 22 they served, apparently, via fax, an unsigned document from a 23 third party who was not verified, it didn't comply with any of 24 the federal rules of civil procedure. It wasn't signed. It

25

wasn't identified. The questions weren't there, and they were

not complete.

But nonetheless, after that there were numerous motions addressed by the magistrate judge who gave them extension after extension.

THE COURT: Well, on other things, not the request for admission.

MR. ANDERSON: Including the request for admissions, sir, which were stipulated by the parties that they would have an opportunity to be relieved from their waiver that was caused by their untimely and ineffective --

THE COURT: I think in July of 18 you moved to compel disclosures and responses to Plaintiff's First Request For Production and Interrogatories. That did not deal with the request for admit which Defendants claim had been sent to you four days before the motion to compel.

MR. ANDERSON: Yes. Well, the — there was no need to compel because they did not file responses within the 30 days required and therefore they're deemed admitted. At that point Defendants need to move to be relieved from that admission.

That is not our burden to do so but their burden to do so.

Because again an unsigned, faxed copy where we never agreed to accept facsimile, unverified set that came in approximately five days late via fax without any notifications

don't qualify as valid responses.

And as I indicated, the federal rules specifically say if they aren't compliant then they can't be relied on and they don't count.

But after that, again, the magistrate judge gave — we stipulated that he could be relieved from that default if he just provided the answers by February 22, 2019. He was required by stipulation number 50 to serve them on both parties, that is, Mr. Allan and myself. It's in document 50, the stipulation, that in detail goes through and explains all the dates and deadlines and sets forth that they're incomplete.

THE COURT: Yes, that stipulation seems to be dubious to me. It seems like there was new counsel in the case that had not been representing the Defendants when they purportedly filed a response.

And there doesn't seem to be any indication in the record that that new counsel actually even was aware that a response had been filed, whether it was a timely response, whether it was a sufficient response. It's different from no response. And it appears to me that that counsel was not even aware of that event when he entered into the stipulation.

So —

MR. ANDERSON: Well, sir.

THE COURT: - I think the argument that the

Defendant is making is that the Court was defrauded.

But in that course of conduct the counsel that came in and represented the Defendant may have also been misled.

MR. ANDERSON: No, sir. We had numerous meet and confer letters with counsel, repeated conversations with counsel, and they were aware. They had even requested that I agreed to set aside the admissions that occur as a matter of law for failure to provide them, and we did so.

THE COURT: See, you're not the judge here. You're an attorney. You're an advocate for a party. You seem to be usurping the role of the judge saying what is deemed admitted, and what has the force of law. All of that is before this Court now. And it does seem to me that, frankly, I was misled by representations by you — not that there were untimely filed responses or inadequate responses, but there were no responses to the request to admit.

Apparently what your position is, is you have ruled on that issue and determined that they were inadequate and therefore there was no response.

But it seems to me incumbent upon you to have demonstrated to me that there were responses filed that may have been adequate or not adequate, but the fact of filing should have been made known to me.

MR. ANDERSON: Sir, on the day of the hearing in light of the many -- I mean, this case had been going at that

point for several years. But again, I would like to go 1 through a few items here to demonstrate the fact there. 2 3 But the bottom line there, and as I put in my reply 4 brief that again, without -- they're untimely. And the rule 5 says if they aren't provided then they're deemed admitted. 6 THE COURT: And the case law also says that the 7 Court has great discretion in dealing with pro se --8 MR. ANDERSON: Yes. 9 THE COURT: No, no, wait. You're doing it again. 10 MR. ANDERSON: Sorry. 11 That the Court has discretion in dealing THE COURT: 12 with pro se litigants in waiving an untimely filed pleading. 13 But I have to know about it to make that exercise of 14 discretion. 15 MR. ANDERSON: Mr -- his counsel was aware of it, 16 and he did not provide that. We -- again, if I had a few 17 minutes to go through the file, I could probably find a few 18 letters where counsel specifically requested that. 19 20

But I know he requested to be relieved from the failure -- the deemed admission that is set forth in the federal rules.

THE COURT: That is subject to the Court's discretion.

21

22

23

24

25

MR. ANDERSON: And he could make a motion to seek to have it set aside. That's what he needs to do, and we advised him of that. But yet he never filed such a motion. He never provided the initial disclosures. He didn't provide the other discovery requests that — responses that we had repeatedly made. And again, they were never served properly. They weren't served under the federal rules.

You can't fax somebody an unsigned document and call that a discovery response.

Counsel had an opportunity to work with it. He had been involved, came in in September of 2018. He was involved in the case for many, many months until the following June.

But I want to go through a few facts here to demonstrate the state of mind that I had at the time.

First of all, as you know, we filed the complaint in this action in December of '17.

In February of 2018, in document 7, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss stating they are not the owners of the operating of the restaurant. He's — movant Luis Maestre is acting as the sole proprietor, as a custodian for the sole proprietor established by his brother who lived in Columbia since 2016.

So they came out denied. Adriana also said she isn't involved in any way in the store.

We filed document A --

THE COURT: How is any of that relevant to the motion before the Court right now?

MR. ANDERSON: I was going to --

THE COURT: The motion before the Court right now is that summary judgment should be set aside because of misrepresentations to the Court by you. It has nothing to do with, doesn't seem to me, with Mr. Maestre or his wife with respect to claims of ownership.

MR. ANDERSON: As far as the request for admissions go, again, the stipulation that we signed, the time that we spent with counsel to work through the fact that they had not provided adequate responses to any of the discovery up to that point.

And as far as I was aware, and I still maintain, that those fax copies of July 23rd are not valid documents as a matter of law. They are unsigned. They aren't identified. They aren't labeled. There was no proof of service. They were never mailed. They were simply faxed and they aren't signed. They're completely ineffective under Rule 26 which requires a signature.

Now, even if they had just been signed or verified, but they never did that. They were deemed admitted. We went ahead and we made motions.

THE COURT: So when something is deemed admitted --

MR. ANDERSON: Yes --

THE COURT: -- who does that deeming?

MR. ANDERSON: The law. Rule 36 states that a

failure to deny within the time it is deemed admitted. And after those 30 days go by it is not the propounding party's job to go ask the Court to deem them admitted. They are deemed admitted as a matter of law because they were never served. They were never signed, and they were untimely from the outset. They were already deemed admitted.

So the document themselves, this -- this fax does not serve as a response to request for admissions.

On top of that there were objections. There are objections in there. We dealt with counsel about those objections. They promised to provide us with further responses but they never did.

And if you look at document 63, Your Honor, this is important, after — at or around the time when the third attorney sought to withdraw, when Mr. Tran sought to withdraw, Adriana Teran and Luis Maestre signed a sworn document that says: "We understand, we need to send more information and documents to Anderson because of the Judge, but we do not have the information yet."

So again, it is clear that all the way up through March of 2019 they were admitting that they had not provided the documents. They had not provided the answers, and they had not done so without objections. They waived because they did not timely respond to the RFAs or to any of the other discovery.

Ultimately, after the magistrate judge was involved, he encouraged my co-counsel and I to stipulate, to give them another chance. We thought about the fact that he was a proper at some points. We gave them the opportunity.

The stipulation, sir, is a signed document. It resulted in a court order itself, namely, the Court's Scheduling Order.

There were numerous motions for sanctions in between filed by us that were kicked back by the Court, that is, the magistrate judge. The magistrate judge signed on February 21, 2019, that the Court was not willing to allow Mr. Tran withdraw until the stipulated discovery agreement had been satisfied.

And with respect to that, we also were requesting complete addresses and contact information for the Defendants.

As this Court is well aware, mail came back from this Court, mail came back from Plaintiff addressed to the proper Defendant. So he wasn't even responding.

And Mr. Peace, the prior counsel had indicated in his declaration that Luis Maestre's address was reflected on his driver's license and that's the reason we sought to see his driver's license.

THE COURT: In a very improper way, I might say.

MR. ANDERSON: Well, he's the -- again, I don't know what's improper. He -- I asked him, do you have your driver's

license? He showed it to me. I took a picture of it.

THE COURT: Well, he says, and it doesn't seem to be contradicted, that that was a condition of a hearing going forward.

MR. ANDERSON: This was after the last hearing Mr -THE COURT: I think as I recall the affidavit it was before the last hearing.

MR. ANDERSON: It was in the hallway after the last hearing. You were there. I have a copy of the photo I can show you the exact time on it.

THE COURT: I'm saying, as an officer of the Court if you're accosting a party in the hall and telling them that they have to produce an identification before the hearing goes forward, that's an egregious violation of your --

MR. ANDERSON: I don't disagree, sir. Although that is not what happened. It was after the hearing. The Court had already issued the injunctive order, final order. We were in the hallway. We were talking. Counsel was there. I was there. Rigoberto was there. And I asked him, "Can I take a picture of your driver's license?" He voluntarily pulled it out. I took a picture of it.

Again, they're painting a story here to try to get vour ire because --

THE COURT: They don't have to get my ire. The story they are painting is very consistent with the impression

1 | 2 |

I formed through your representation at the last hearing that is very consistent with what I observed. So I don't know that they're drawing my ire. They're just --

MR. ANDERSON: Well, sir, it's not true and counsel can verify that. I can show you the Court that.

THE COURT: So you're saying the timing is different than?

MR. ANDERSON: Absolutely. If you allow me to turn on my phone I will show you that it was approximately 12:00. It was after our last hearing. It was not before. I have not had any direct communication, except a couple phone calls with Mr. Maestre, since such time.

And again, to simply request a Defendant who is now a judgment debtor to provide identification that shows his driver's license to show where he lives when we've had mail returned is not an unreasonable request.

But as far as that last hearing goes, again, I had come in on a red eye flight. Perhaps I was confused about the question about whether or not he ever provided. But if you ask me again, "Did he serve you responses to those RFAs?" The answer is still, "No."

A July 23rd facsimile that is not signed, that is not verified under Rule 26, and is not even identified, and they were incomplete. They had objections that were waived. And we wrote Mr. Maestre. I personally wrote and dealt with

Mr. Maestre several times to try to get additional responses.

They agreed to provide additional responses repeatedly but never did.

We stipulated with counsel. He came in. The magistrate judge spent numerous hearings on that. I think there were three and four hearings.

And, in fact, while he ordered them to provide it by a date certain they still didn't do it. I requested sanctions. The magistrate judge denied them on the grounds that he was a pro per.

But what I was trying to get at before was ever since the beginning of this case the Defendants have been waffling back and forth. And if you give me just a few minutes I can show you that, for example, in their motion to dismiss he denied it was his store.

In their answer filed with this Court and signed under penalty of perjury they denied that they ran the operation.

They have denials to paragraph 17 to 22 which respectively say Luis Maestre and Adriana Maestre have an ice cream store in Charlotte. They deny all that.

Now, we also provided in document 8, and the exhibits in 8, way, way back there, documents that showed that they had a number of websites that said they began their operations in 2015. Those are what's on their websites. I

provided those years ago. I provided a couple extra copies yesterday.

We were concerned even then because we saw that Mocachica chicken restaurant shared an Instagram account and Facebook account with La Michoacana, which was an unincorporated association, that Luis Maestre denied was his. Said it was the brother's in Columbia. He denied he had any relationship to Mocachica. But the Mocachica website itself says "it is brought to you from the same people that own La Michoacana."

Moving on.

In their answer they denied running the restaurant.

In the motion to dismiss that's at 13, document 13, again, they said: "Movants are not the owners of the restaurant."

Now they're trying to say that they were all the way back since 2008, but they never provided any such information.

Counsel here wants to say we agree or don't dispute the issue of priority. That could not be any further from the truth.

Simply by providing one declaration after he's been found adjudged liable in this case to say that's good sufficient to grant a summary judgment.

Most of all, counsel's arguments all refer to summary judgment standards. This is a Rule 60 motion.

They're seeking extraordinary relief. This is about a court order that happened last June.

In our motion for preliminary injunction also, document 22, there are declarations by myself that refer to what the photographs and the information about the stores.

You see, in February of 2018, when they were represented by Mr. Peace and Mr. Osborne, Defendants indicated to us and the Court that they had taken down the signage and that they were in compliance.

Later after numerous motions to withdraw, Luis was self-represented. He agreed to meet with me so we could discuss the upcoming requirement that we meet and confer and set a scheduling order and whatnot. And he wanted me to come by the store and see that he had taken down the signage.

I went in there, I saw it and I provided photographs for this Court that there were a number of Michoacana on the labels, on the signs, on the walls, and even a sign right next to the cash register the first phone number on it says Mocachica.

So when I walked in there to meet the Defendant, he ran out the back door. I called his cell phone. He didn't answer. I walked over to Mocachica to see if he was there. He wasn't. They told me that he had no relation to the business. I knew that wasn't true. Now today they're saying it's his aunt's business. His Aunt Thelma Mendoza. But our

research already showed that Thelma Mendoza, he and Adriana Teran shared a residence prior to that. So we knew there was a connection there.

When I walked into that store and was told "Luis isn't here. We don't know who Luis is." He had a meeting with him. He had taken up time. I took time, I went across town. It wasn't nearly as heavy handed as counsel would like it to be. Quite frankly I was a little bit amused. You can see in the picture I'm actually laughing because I said, "You can leave this for Luis." And that was when I flipped the bird at them because they wouldn't put him in contact with me and he was avoiding me.

I don't know as a Plaintiff how to work with a court order that requires us to meet and confer when the Defendant pro per won't even talk to you and runs out when you have a meeting with him.

But irrespectively, they never provided the responses.

Counsel, in fact, has made this whole motion seizing upon a declaration 31-1, where I stated to this Court that we received incomplete unsigned documents. 31-1 which, again I'll look at the docket, that didn't solve the problem. It just got kicked down the road again.

Thirty-one I made a motion to compel initial disclosures and responses to the discovery sets.

I don't

We did, I believe, include discussion in there, and 1 2 clearly counsel's aware, that I forthright told the Court we 3 got this fax, but it's not sufficient. 4 THE COURT: On page 13 of the hearing I asked you 5 pointblank: 6 "Mr. Anderson, have you received any responses to 7 your request to admit? 8 "ANSWER: Not that I'm aware of, Your Honor. have any in my file." 9 10 MR. ANDERSON: Yes. And as I indicated, those --11 that fax was insufficient, and I put reference to that fax in my document, in my declaration 31-1. I was never intending to 12 13 hide that fact from the Court. 14 After a red eye flight, and 2 years later and a 15 stipulation in which the other side agreed to provide answers 16 but yet didn't, maybe I was mistaken in how I read the 17 question from the Court, meaning, in response to the 18 stipulation or since February or ever. 19 But again I still --20 Page 12: "We never received responses THE COURT: 21 for the requests to admissions." 22 Page 15: "However, frankly, I did not even open it 23 or look at it because we already had motions for summary 24 judgment pending."

MR. ANDERSON: That was for the second set of

25

requests.

THE COURT: That is for the second set.

MR. ANDERSON: That is for the second set, sir.

THE COURT: That's true.

MR. ANDERSON: The first set, again, I still maintain I never got responses.

THE COURT: Do you understand that legally there's a difference between not responding and an inadequate response? Is that concept familiar to you?

MR. ANDERSON: I do. But as I indicated, and again, I've been practicing law, it will be 30 years this year. So with all due respect, sir, I know the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 26(g)(1) requires a verification, a signature on the document by an attorney or by a party.

It's not signed. It also -- rule -- I think it's 36 requires that you set forth the answer underneath the question. Well, they didn't do that.

But Rule 36 also gives them 30 days or it is deemed admitted. They didn't do it in time.

And then they had objections that were waived. And I'm telling you, I wrote repeated, meet and confer letters to the Defendant himself and, ultimately, to Mr. Tran. We addressed this.

So again, if you look at document number 31, I made it clear to the magistrate judge that we were seeking to

compel those answers.

The Court in 33 ordered responses to the ROGs and the RFPs. Also that they give us discovery -- initial disclosures. But that too wasn't complied with.

As you see in 38, then the Court reset, gave them additional time to answer. We went back through this again.

Ultimately, so on 47 the Court denied the motion for sanctions.

I know that the Court didn't like my stipulation with the Defendant himself. So it was a good thing he got counsel, and we were able to provide the subsequent under 50, which was both the stipulation about the scheduling order, and also to resolve the parties discovery disputes.

And, sir, we were as fair as we could be. We agreed to let him have a fair clean shot. He got 45 days, I think, to respond to that discovery by February so he could — if he was supposed to provide the answers by, I believe, February 22nd. He did not. He was required to provide them to myself and Mr. Allan. He did not.

And those first set of requests for admissions, as far as I'm concerned, have never been provided. And under Rule 26(g) without being signed they just don't count.

And as I indicated in my response, there's actually a statement in 26 that says, "other parties have no duty to act on an unsigned disclosure, request, response, or objection

7

8

9

10

11 12

13

14

15

16

17 18

19

20

21

22

23

24 25

until it is signed. And the Court must strike it unless a signature is promptly supplied after the omission is called to the attorney or party's attention."

That's FRCP 26(q)(2).

I don't know why counsel can suggest that somehow I'm playing fast and loose with the facts or misleading the Court about the first set of requests for admissions.

And it wasn't just the first set of request for It was the initial disclosures. It was the first admissions. set of interrogatories, first set of document requests.

But ultimately, again, this Court, this Judge, approved the stipulation at the time, made a revised order under 52, and we had continued going forward.

Then again after February 22, 2019, when the responses didn't come in, we made a motion for sanctions. But what we were met with was a motion to withdraw.

And in that motion to withdraw counsel specifically indicated what his client needed to do, and that included providing those discovery responses which leads to document 63 where Luis and Adriana admit that "we need to send more information and documents to Anderson because of the Judge but we don't have the information yet."

Now I don't know when the case is filed in 2017 why we have to wait, ultimately, what, years for discovery. we've been trying to be good to a pro per when he was pro per. But he went through three or four attorneys along the way, filed a cross complaint.

And finally, Your Honor, even the initial disclosures themselves, as I pointed out, those are required to be sent to both myself and Mr. Allan by the 11th of February. I brought with me Mr. Tran's envelope dated February 12th. So even the disclosures — initial disclosures didn't comply with either stipulation or the Court Order.

So repeatedly they blew deadlines. They left us in the lurch. Again, I don't know as a Plaintiff what we can do when the Defendant is simply ducking out and hiding and not providing discovery responses.

But on one specific day, again, I did not miss — I mean, I may have misspoke, but I certainly, without intention, and again, perhaps some confusion based on the fact that the stipulation required them to provide these amended responses by February 22nd, and as of June of 19 they still had not come in.

THE COURT: What about the allegation Defendants make that appears noticed for deposition on April 10, 2019, and showed up for the deposition, neither attorney was there prepared to take the deposition.

MR. ANDERSON: Mr. Tran had apparently indicated — I had sent that to Mr. Tran while he was represented. We never got confirmation, and I was not aware that the Defendant

was even aware of that. Because we had sent the deposition notice --

THE COURT: So you're not contesting that he showed up for his deposition and attorneys were not prepared to go forward --

MR. ANDERSON: He did show up --

THE COURT: -- based upon notice.

MR. ANDERSON: — in Mr. Allan's office, in, I believe that was April of '19. No, I was not there. I was not aware. I had believed that it would be rescheduled because I never got confirmation either from the Defendant or his prior counsel who I had served the notice but not to the Defendant himself.

By the way, there was a subpoena for documents attached to that, and he didn't provide any documents that day or bring any with him that I'm aware of.

THE COURT: And what about the allegation with respect to threatening — the post summary judgment threatening telephone calls in which the Defendant alleges that you threatened him with arrest?

MR. ANDERSON: After we had filed the motion for contempt that was before this Court, has been remaining before this Court now for six months or so, he was self-represented. We had a telephone discussion. I think I put the context of that in my declaration to that motion in which Mr. Maestre

laughed at me. He told me PIM would be handling it. I should chase them for the money. He refused to turn over any of the domain names, said he didn't have possession of them.

THE COURT: But you're not denying that you told him that he would be subject to arrest?

MR. ANDERSON: I told him that we would be seeking an order that he appear in court or ultimately what would be a order for examination of judgment debtor or that we would be seeking contempt against him and that he had a court order ordering him not to sell this infringing ice cream. He was selling the infringing ice cream. He admitted selling the infringing ice cream.

And I told him that he if he did not pay anything, and he continued to violate the order that we would seek an order for contempt and that would -- might include financial and even potentially that he could go to jail.

I never said to him that I would seek his arrest, but I did indicate that we would be asking the Court for sanctions for his contemptuous actions that continued after he was served with a court order prohibiting him from using the marks.

THE COURT: See, I'm particularly concerned with a statement whether or not you told him that he could be arrested.

MR. ANDERSON: I did not use the word "arrested."

But I did say that punishment for contempt may include financial and could include jail. That's true.

He's a self-represented party who is not following a very clear court order. And in as much as he's not paying — again, we would — and we are seeking recourse for his failure to comply with this Court's order.

Which brings me to the question of why PIM -THE COURT: So when he says in document 116

paragraph 47: "Mr. Anderson was clearly frustrated and said
that I was in violation of the Order and that he was going to
call the Judge and have me and my wife arrested because we
were not following the Judge's Order."

MR. ANDERSON: Well, sir, clearly this man is both — and I can demonstrate it repeatedly. He is a blatant liar, and to his credit, he doesn't understand English so well. So I don't know where he got that. But I never told him that he or his wife — I never even mentioned his wife.

At best of all I would say "We are seeking to hold you in contempt for failing to comply with federal court order." That was very explicit that required him to stop using the mark, and he was continuing to use the mark, and I advised him that we were seeking the contempt citation against him.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ANDERSON: But I was not -- I would never call

the Judge. I mean, that in itself shows it's nonsense. I don't call the Judge. You don't take my phone calls. Why would I say such a thing?

THE COURT: Ms. Chapman, I will be glad to hear from you in brief rebuttal.

MS. CHAPMAN: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

There is a portion of the transcript from the hearing that we have not focused on that I think is important. The transcript is document 109-3, and on page 13 of 48, at line 3 the Court was addressing Mr. Tran, who was then the Defendant's counsel.

And the Court states: "Mr. Tran, where in the docket is there any indication that the request to admit filed by the Plaintiffs have been responded to in any way by the Defendants?"

Mr. Tran responded: "Your Honor, I don't see it on the docket, but I do see, I guess, in our file that there was a response to the request for admissions. I'm just not certain — I can't confirm right now how and when it was submitted. But there were some responses to their request for admissions. And I have a couple of copies here to see maybe before I got involved if Mr. Anderson's team has received these responses to their RFAs."

Then the Court stated: "Mr. Anderson, have you received any responses to your request to admit?

"Mr. Anderson: Not that I'm aware of, Your Honor. I don't have any in my file."

The Court then granted summary judgment which is clear from document 78. Summary judgment was granted on the basis that there were no responses to the request for admissions. This is made very clear.

It's Your Honor's Order so I feel almost funny saying this.

But it's clear from the Order the way that I read it, that the reason summary judgment was granted was based on the mistaken understanding or belief that no responses had been provided.

In that Footnote 1 to the Order, the Court found it proper to deem the responses to the document requests timely.

And similarly, here, we would request that the Court do the same with regard to the responses to the request for admissions.

I don't know why that stipulation in docket 50 was entered into. I personally called Mr. Tran when I got involved in this case after we cleared conflicts, and I spoke with Mr. DeAntonio's firm, the Bradley law firm. I called Mr. Tran and I asked him about that stipulation, and why did they enter into that stipulation. It doesn't seem from my review of all of the discovery responses that had been provided, I do not see a problem with the responses. There is

nothing that is in the opposition to this motion that explains why deficiencies existed in the responses to the interrogatories or request for production.

THE COURT: Well, I think Mr. Anderson has indicated that throughout this litigation that they were unsigned, unidentified, not properly served.

MS. CHAPMAN: And so I looked — we did the research on that, Your Honor. This is stated in our reply brief.

What we learned from the research that we conducted is that when a discovery response is unsigned, when that is brought to the attention of the litigant or the attorney, that the proper thing to do is to prepare and sign the responses.

Which is what I personally did. I just did this myself. I looked at the responses. I saw what they said, and the ones that they were complaining of that had not been signed I had my secretary prepare them on the appropriate form that is customarily used in this jurisdiction, and we served them. And they are attached to my declaration in support of our reply brief on this motion.

So that -- that issue -- and we also have an argument in our reply brief that the name of Mr. Maestre on the cover sheet that accompanied the facsimile, that his name was on there when he was in pro per when these were served, that is good enough to constitute a "signature" for the purposes of Rule 26.

3

1

4

5 6

7 8

9 10

11

1213

14

15

1617

18 19

20

2122

23

2425

having done the research and read what I'm supposed to do in that circumstance, we then went ahead, like I said, and prepared signed responses. I didn't change the content of the responses, but I did sign them and served those, and they are in front of the Court.

But I did not want to leave anything to chance.

So I respectfully submit that we have cured whatever deficiency existed. And what remains crystal clear is that the responses were provided. They were provided on July 23rd, 2018, and the mistaken belief that they hadn't been provided is what resulted in summary judgment.

And under Rule 60 (b) I believe we have met all of the requirements we are supposed to meet. The motion is timely. We showed meritorious defense in response to request for admission 36, and the interrogatories that were provided the responses to the interrogatories, and there is no unfair prejudice.

In fact, this corrects what had been prejudicial to the Defendant, and I believe it is within the furtherance of justice.

There was a mistake. The mistake resulted in summary judgment. Rule 60(b) provides a mechanism to correct it. I believe we met all the requirements under that rule.

That turns us then to summary judgment, and why summary judgment should be granted in favor of the Defendant.

THE COURT: Well that -- you addressed that in your opening.

MS. CHAPMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: My rebuttal was for anything — brief rebuttal for anything new that you needed to respond to.

MS. CHAPMAN: My understanded from when Mr. Anderson was speaking was that he said it was one declaration. I would just point out there were a number of declarations, including Alma Garcia, Patricia Arguelles, Javier Lopez, and Caesar Torrez, and Luis Maestre. And all of those declarations provide evidence of priority of use, and there is nothing in the opposition that contests that.

So with that, Your Honor, I believe we could submit.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. CHAPMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: There is a lot, Mr. Anderson, about the way you've handled this case that bothers the Court from the beginning to the end, and I am troubled by the event that occurred the day before the preliminary injunction hearing and there are two versions of it. And the Court wants to get to the bottom of what happened on that day. Because not only is it troubling in and of itself, but if Ms. Garcia is believed, then there have been misrepresentations to this Court about what happened.

And so I have before me an affidavit from Ms. Garcia

and responses from Mr. Anderson, both in writing and here in 1 2 explanation orally. 3 I would like an opportunity to assess the 4 credibility of Ms. Rebecca Garcia. 5 And how soon do you think you can make that happen, 6 Ms. Chapman? 7 MS. CHAPMAN: We will call her right after the 8 hearing. I will do everything I can to make it happen as soon 9 as possible. 10 THE COURT: Can you do it today? 11 MS. CHAPMAN: Can she come today? 12 THE COURT: Yes. 13 I can find out. There is -- I believe MS. CHAPMAN: 14 there is another lawyer who was helping Mr. Maestre, who is 15 not of record, and she was in contact with this witness. So I 16 will -- if we could take a break, why don't I call her right 17 now? 18 THE COURT: I'm going to do that. I'm going to 19 leave this hearing open and ask the -- what time is it now? 20 11:13. I will ask you before lunchtime whether you've had any 21 ability to secure the testimony of Ms. Garcia by the end of 22 the day. And if not, we'll set it at sometime -- we'll set a 23

MS. CHAPMAN: So I'm going to tell you today whether

hearing sometime in the future.

she is available to come.

24

```
1
               THE COURT: I want to hear her today.
 2
               MS. CHAPMAN:
                            Want to hear her today, understood.
 3
          I will go work on that right now.
     Yes.
 4
               THE COURT: We're all here.
 5
               MS. CHAPMAN:
                             Yes.
 6
               THE COURT:
                          This is before me. I would like to hear
 7
    her today if possible.
               MS. CHAPMAN: I understand. I will go work on that
 8
 9
    right now.
10
               THE COURT: All right. Anything further from either
11
     side before we -- I'm going to ask everybody to come back at
12
    2:00 and -- but I would like to hear from you as soon as
    possible with respect to the availability of Ms. Garcia today.
13
14
               MS. CHAPMAN: We will make a call and come back and
    report to whomever is here what the status is.
15
16
               THE COURT:
                           Thank you.
17
               MS. CHAPMAN:
                             Thank you.
18
               THE COURT: Anything further from either side?
19
               MR. DeANTONIO: Your Honor, is there a number that
20
    you would like us to call once we hear from Ms. Garcia?
21
               THE COURT:
                           Yes. You can call the deputy clerk.
22
               MR. DeANTONIO: Okay. I will get her number.
23
               THE COURT: Get her number, and I will see everybody
24
    at 2:00.
25
               (The matter is in recess at 11:15.)
```

(The Court reconvened at 2:00.)

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

ALL COUNSEL: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Chapman, do you have anything to report with respect to the Rebecca Garcia matter?

MR. DeANTONIO: Yes, Your Honor. This is Matt DeAntonio.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DeANTONIO: I'm happy to report after this morning's proceedings we attempted to contact Ms. Garcia immediately after we adjourned. We called Ms. Garcia and — her phone number — her phone was not picking up. It went straight to some recording.

And so the next thing we did was try to contact her through a mutual acquaintance of the Defendants. And Ms. Garcia — and through doing that we understand she is at work today, and she doesn't get off until 3:30. So unfortunately we're unable to produce her for testimony today.

So, you know, we understand and appreciate the Court's desire to hear from her directly. So what we can commit to doing is trying to get back in touch with her later this afternoon and reporting back to the Court as to what she says.

Just to be candid with the Court, I think we do have some question as to whether she would ultimately be willing to

appear. And that's just based on what we heard from this mutual acquaintance about her fear — her fear of coming to court. Unfortunately, that's just the reality. And we're doing what we can to produce her. We will, if she agrees to do it.

The only thing I'll add to this is that we attempted with the declarations to provide some contemporaneous accounts on what happened beyond just the written testimony.

THE COURT: Yes. You don't have to go into a substantive analysis. I do have what I have in front of me, and I can make rulings based upon what I have.

I just thought it would be a stronger record to actually hear from -- I heard from Mr. Anderson, but to hear from the other participant in the interaction.

So I think what I will do is hold this open, and my thought was to hold it open until March 27th. And between now and March 27th if you can procure the attendance of Ms. Garcia to give live testimony here, we'll schedule that.

In doing so I would expect the attorneys to work on possible agreeable dates. So in other words, if you talk to Ms. Garcia and you find out from her when she's available, try as best you can to coordinate with opposing counsel to an agreeable date, and opposing counsel can be here to cross-examine, can participate by phone or waive appearance. It doesn't matter to me. But let's try to get that done

between now and March 27th.

You may come back to me and say she's just not willing to get involved, doesn't want to testify, may come back and say that there are dates that she's available to do it but defense counsel is not available. We'll just take those one at a time.

Mr. Anderson.

MR. ANDERSON: Yes. I will not be waiving or walking away from this. I do intend to cross-examine --

THE COURT: I'm not sure I'm going to let you cross-examine. I might have Mr. Allan cross-examine. I think there is sufficient evidence in the record that would call into question the fairness of you examining her, but we'll cross that bridge at a later date.

So maybe the best thing for you to do, Mr. Anderson, before leaving here today, is provide a list of available dates that you might have, and we'll see if that coordinates with the witness.

MS. CHAPMAN: Your Honor, may I ask a question? THE COURT: Yes.

MS. CHAPMAN: I would request that the Court enter an order prohibiting Mr. Anderson from contacting the witness.

Mr. Albert Allan can do that but I don't think it is appropriate --

THE COURT: Yes. I will do that. I will do that

50 orally. There's enough evidence in the record of 1 2 Mr. Anderson's unprofessional conduct in the first instance to justify such an order. There's a photograph that you don't 3 4 denv and that's sufficient for me. MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, a photograph of flipping 5 6 the bird at someone is not a threat and --7 THE COURT: We're not arguing that right now but it 8 is sufficient for me to enter an oral directive to you not to 9 have contact with Ms. Garcia. 10 MR. ANDERSON: Okay. Can the Court provide us with 11 some information about this so call Rebecca Vadal Garcia. We 12 have no way of contacting her. We don't know who she is. 13 THE COURT: Well, good, so then it won't be a 14 You are directed not to contact her. problem. 15 MR. ANDERSON: But we have the right to conduct 16 discovery into the allegations that have been made. 17

THE COURT: She has submitted an affidavit. expressed an interest in hearing from her with live testimony, and so that's what we're trying to schedule. There is no other discovery issue involved in this at this point.

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

She submitted an affidavit. I have heard from you, and I have expressed a desire to hear from her in person, and that's what we will arrange.

So -- so that's what you should do, Mr. Anderson. You should give defense counsel a list of dates between now and March 27th which you might be available. And then defense counsel should coordinate with Ms. Garcia and inform the Court as to the dates that are possible for her testimony.

So let me see if there is anything else that we need to discuss?

There was a conflict in the evidence presented to me with respect to the outside-the-courtroom interaction between Mr. Anderson and the Defendants. And I had meant to come back to Ms. Chapman and see where that stood with respect to -- there's a significant difference in the Court's mind with respect to the timing of that encounter.

Are you — is there anything about what you heard, Ms. Chapman, that would change your position as to whether it occurred before the hearing or after the hearing?

MR. DeANTONIO: Your Honor, we conferred with Mr. Maestre during the break and confirmed with him that according to us this happened before the Court hearing that day. So no change in our view.

THE COURT: Then I would like to hear that testimony. I would like to hear testimony, as long as we're doing it, I would like to hear testimony from Mr -- is it Maestre? Is that --

MR. DeANTONIO: Maestre.

THE COURT: Say it again.

MR. DeANTONIO: Maestre.

1	THE COURT: Maestre.	
2	MR. DeANTONIO: That's good.	
3	THE COURT: I would like to hear testimony on that,	
4	as well as the telephone call interaction that is in his	
5	affidavit.	
6	MR. DeANTONIO: Sure. So that we can prepare for	
7	that testimony.	
8	THE COURT: Let's do it right now.	
9	MR. DeANTONIO: I'll do it right now.	
10	THE COURT: Yes.	
11	MR. DeANTONIO: Okay. Can you give us one second to	
12	explain to him?	
13	THE COURT: Yes.	
14	Before we get to that, for counsel's information, I	
15	have said between now and March 27th with respect to	
16	Ms. Garcia, except for March 12th, March 26th, or March 15th	
17	through the 18th.	
18	LUIS MAESTRE, Defendant WITNESS, SWORN	
19	DIRECT EXAMINATION	
20	BY MS. CHAPMAN:	
21	Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Maestre.	
22	Will you please tell the Court about interactions you	
23	have had with Mr. Anderson in the courtroom or outside of the	
24	courtroom?	
25	THE COURT. And I'm sorry Both of you are out of	

district. We have a very strange custom here that when you're addressing the Court you stand, when you're addressing a witness you sit.

And so as awkward as that can be for out of district counsel that's the policy here.

MS. CHAPMAN: Thank you. For the clarification. It's interesting.

Q. I'll start again.

Mr. Maestre, can you please tell the Court about interactions you have had with Mr. Anderson in this courthouse outside the courtroom?

A. Yes. Yes.

- 13 0. Please tell His Honor about that.
 - A. So, Your Honor, when the first time that we came over here to court, Anderson got up and he met us before we came inside the courtroom. When he saw my wife he said, "Oh I already know who you are. And the one that I haven't had the pleasure of meeting or seeing is you. I want to see your ID."

And I asked, "Why am I going to show you my ID?"

And he said, "Don't make things difficult. If you don't show me your ID, the Court is not going to be able to proceed."

So he obligated me to hand him my ID. He took my ID, placed it in his hand, and I was surprised that without asking for my permission he took my ID, and he took a picture of it

1 with his phone.

- And I asked him, "Why did you take a picture?"

 He said, "Shut up," and that's it.
 - Q. Was Mr. Anderson speaking in English or Spanish?
- 5 A. He was speaking Spanish. He speaks Spanish at 100 percent.
- Q. You indicated that this happened the first time you came to court. Do you have an understanding of the purpose of the court proceeding on that day?
- 10 A. That I needed to show up in court because of the suit 11 that he had filed against me.
- Q. Do you have any understanding of the nature of the proceedings that day?
- A. I was very confused. I thought it was like when you show up to traffic court or something, to pay a ticket or something. I didn't know because I didn't have an attorney at
- 17 | the time.
- 18 Q. Do you remember the date that this incident occurred?
- A. Yes. It was June 1, 2018. It's impossible for me to forget that day because the day before he showed up to
- 21 intimidate me. And I came to court and I was very nervous.
- Q. You testified that this discussion with your identification happened before the Court hearing. Are you sure about that?
- 25 A. I'm sure -- so I'm sure that it happened before the

actual proceeding. It wasn't in this courtroom in particular,

it was in another courtroom. When we walked in, he got up,

and he met my wife and I, like, halfway down the hallway.

MS. CHAPMAN: May I move on to the next incident, Your Honor, or does Your Honor have any follow-up?

THE COURT: I don't have any questions.

MS. CHAPMAN: Okay.

- Q. Mr. Maestre, did you ever come to court in connection with this case on another occasion?
- A. Yes. I've been here before on another occasion. So that
 was the first time that I came to court that date that I told
 you about the picture but prior to that I hadn't been to
 court.
- Q. I'm sorry. Did Mr. Anderson ever call your personal cell phone at any time?
- 16 **|** A. Yes.

4

5

6

7

8

9

24

- 17 Q. How many times?
- 18 A. I would say on about three occasions.
- 19 Q. Can you tell us about each telephone call, please?
- A. I remember that one of the times was after the Judge had ruled after the hearing, and it had to do with the fact that I needed to turn over their the domains, and that I had to pay the money.
 - So I told him, "Anderson, look, you can contact Go Daddy.

 They're ready to hand over the domains."

And then he also mentioned that "If you don't cooperate in regards to the payment of the money then I'm going to have them issue an order for your arrest, and I'm gonna tell the judge to arrest or send you to jail, both you and your wife."

And so there was another call that it had to do with Mocachica. And he said that, you know, "I know that you have something to do with Mocachica." And where he threatened to burn down both of the businesses that he alleged I had.

MR. ANDERSON: Objection. Hearsay, motion to strike.

MS. CHAPMAN: Mr. Maestre --

THE COURT: Hang on a second. Objection overruled.

- Q. I am asking you about conversations you had with Mr. Anderson on the telephone, and I would like you to limit your testimony to explaining to the Court conversations you had with Mr. Anderson on the cell phone.
- A. Yeah. So this conversation via the cell phone was in Spanish. So he was demanding that I hand over or turn over the domains, and that I come up with the money. That if I didn't listen to him that he was going to call me into court. That he was going to talk to the judge to issue, like a, an arrest warrant, and for myself and my wife to be arrested.

THE COURT: So is what you just testified about the Mocachica and burning down the building, that wasn't in a telephone conversation?

1	THE WITNESS: So the last conversation that I had			
2	with Anderson was regarding that. But then the conversation			
3	before that was a conversation that alluded to the fact that I			
4	wasn't hurrying up to hand over certain things. He said, "I'm			
5	gonna burn Mocachica and Michoacana."			
6	Any time that my phone would ring and I would see			
7	that it was Anderson, it was just to intimidate me and to			
8	threaten me.			
9	THE COURT: So you're saying this happened in a			
10	phone conversation that he talked to you about burning the			
11	building down?			
12	THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor.			
13	THE COURT: The last conversation you had with him			
14	on the phone?			
15	THE WITNESS: The last conversation that I had with			
16	him was over the phone, and it was regarding turning over the			
17	domains, and to pay him the money.			
18	THE COURT: So did this conversation that you allege			
19	you had with Mr. Anderson over the phone concerning burning			
20	down the building, did that occur before my order or			
21	afterwards?			
22	THE WITNESS: Before.			
23	MS. CHAPMAN: I have nothing further, Your Honor.			
24	THE COURT: Any cross?			
25	There's no need for hysterics or sighing or other			

1 demonstrative.

3

4

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

2 MR. ANDERSON: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: There's no need for demonstrative sighing. You can ask questions but limit yourself to that.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. ANDERSON:

- Q. Sir, what is your cell phone number?
- 8 A. 704-614-0046.

THE COURT: All right. So if you sigh again Mr.

Allan will be conducting the rest of the conversation. You're there to respectfully ask questions of this witness. You may cross—examine but no demonstrative sighing.

MR. ANDERSON: Again, I apologize. It was not demonstrative --

THE COURT: Just don't do it.

- Q. Sir, how many times have you called my cell phone number?
- 17 A. I've called his office -- I don't know if that's his cell
- 18 phone or his office, but -- so I would ask for Mr. Anderson.
- Sometimes they would say he wasn't there, sometimes he would answer.
- 21 Q. So you never called my cell phone number, is that what
- 22 your testimony is?
- 23 A. I dialed the number. I don't know if it is his personal
- 24 cell or the office number. So I'm not really sure if it's his
- 25 or the office's.

1 | Q. How many times have you called me?

2

3

7

8

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

- A. Five or six, but I don't recall exactly how many times.
- Q. Five or six times during the duration of this case is the
- 4 only amount of times that you believe you called me?
- 5 A. I don't recall the exact amount of times that I've called.
 - Q. Now you allege that I had said something about burning down a building. When and what was the context of that?
- 9 A. Prior to the last court. And Mr. Anderson, I don't know 10 if it's bad what I'm about to say, but I'm going to say it.

Based on the threats that I received, I downloaded a program that recorded all my conversations with Anderson. I'm going to try to contact the company to see if I can retrieve those because I lost the cell phone where I had those recordings. I think if I called the company they can retrieve those calls and place them on my new cell phone.

When you would tell me if you are a friend of my -- if you're friends with my friends, or you're an enemy with my friends, I should say, then you're my enemy. If you want a war, I'll give you a war. Do you remember that?

THE COURT: All right.

MR. ANDERSON: Motion to strike, Your Honor; nonresponsive.

THE COURT: I'll deny the motion. But I'll tell Mr. Maestre, you're here to answer questions not to make any

statements. So listen to the question asked and answer that question.

THE WITNESS: Sorry.

3

4

5

6

7

- Q. Now, you indicated that our discussions were all in Spanish and that you believe that I'm 100 percent fluent in Spanish; is that correct?
 - MS. CHAPMAN: Objection; object to the form.
- THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection as to form.
- 9 Q. Sir, when you spoke to me, did you speak to me in English or in Spanish?
- A. So I spoke to you in Spanish because when I tried to
 speak to you in English, you would indicate or you would tell
 me that you didn't understand to speak to me in Spanish.
- 14 Q. And I spoke to you in Spanish is your testimony?
- 15 A. All calls that you made to me, Anderson, were in Spanish.
- Sometimes I would speak -- try to speak in English, but then he would tell me that he didn't understand.
- 18 But Anderson speaks Spanish very well.
- Q. Now, sir, in your declaration that you submitted to the Court, did you write anything in there about me stating that I was going to burn down some building?
- 22 A. I tried to explain that in court, but I didn't write anything down.
- Q. This declaration that you signed, Document 116, it's 13 pages. You did this in English and in Spanish.

1	MS. CHAPMAN: Object to the form.	
2	THE COURT: I don't know that there's a question.	
3	MS. CHAPMAN: Yeah.	
4	Q. Sir, do you remember signing a declaration in November,	
5	few months ago, that was written by this counsel for you?	
6	MS. CHAPMAN: Object to the form.	
7	THE COURT: I'll sustain as to the form.	
8	Do you intend do show him his declaration?	
9	MR. ANDERSON: I only have the English version with	
10	me, and it's not signed.	
11	THE COURT: We can let's printout a copy of the	
12	declarations.	
13	MR. ANDERSON: Maybe I can just ask the ultimate	
14	question.	
15	THE COURT: Sure.	
16	Q. Sir, isn't it true	
17	THE COURT: Go ahead and sit down.	
18	Q that your declaration you submitted to this Court	
19	makes no reference to any alleged statement where I said	
20	anything about burning buildings?	
21	A. I didn't I didn't write it down on there. But I did	
22	want to express that verbally in court. And I did mention	
23	that to the Court of the threats that were made to	
24	Ms. Rebecca.	
25	THE COURT: It's a simple question. The question	

"Did you put that threat in your declaration?" Yes or 1 is: 2 no? 3 THE WITNESS: I don't recall. 4 Now that's the kind of thing that would be important to 5 put in a declaration, isn't it? 6 I don't -- I don't know -- I wanted to say in my own 7 words here in court. 8 Do you know the date that we last spoke? 9 I don't remember the last time. I remember the last 10 conversation where you threatened me and that you were gonna 11 send me to jail. Another call Anderson made asking me about 12 certain personal --13 THE COURT: No, no, wait. Mr. Maestre, you're there 14 to answer questions not TO give speeches. 15 So the last question was: "Do you remember the date 16 that we last spoke?" Do you remember that or not? 17 THE WITNESS: I don't remember. 18 THE COURT: All right. Next question. 19 Do you recall a time when I asked you if you had put a 20 freezer into your store called Raspados Jalisco that had La 21 Michoacana products in it? 22 MS. CHAPMAN: Object to the form. Outside of the 23 scope. 24 THE COURT: What's the relevance of that question?

MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, I have a declaration here

in the file. It's called "Declaration of Stephen Anderson in
Support of Application for Court Order to Show Cause." It has
extensive description of telephone call on July 18, 2019, and
the context of that discussion and what was said. That would
be part of the contempt motion, I suspect.

I don't have a number on this printout here. But let me just see, signed 22nd of July, '19.

THE COURT: So ask him about that date and see where we get with that.

- Q. (By Mr. Anderson) I have the date -- do you know if you spoke to me on July 18, Mr. Maestre?
- 12 A. Yes, I did speak with you on July 18th.
 - Q. How come you remember that date?

- A. So you're talking about a conversation June 18, if I remember you talked to me about some freezers. I'm not 100 percent sure whether it was June 18th or not. Okay. So let's suppose for the sake of argument that it was June 18th. What happened?
- Q. It was July 18th is the question.
- Now, do you remember speaking to me on or around July of 2019 about a store called Raspados Jalisco?
 - MS. CHAPMAN: Objection.
- THE COURT: Overruled. Let's see where it goes.
- 24 THE WITNESS: I remember that he asked me about 25 Raspados Jalisco, Alechie (phonetic spelling), Compare Foods,

- regard some stores that had some freezers. And I told him,
 "Well, go talk to the owners of those businesses because I
 don't know why they're there."
- Q. Okay. Do you remember that after the Court issued an
 Order that photographs of bunkers, ice cream freezers, and ice
 cream was in your store called "La Michoacana"?
- 7 A. So I remember the Court Order about, you know,
 8 specifically, that I was not supposed to have those products
 9 there. But he assumes that these freezers that are like in
 10 200 stores across North Carolina are mine.
 - Q. Did you have a freezer in your store called "La Michoacana" in which you were enjoined from putting it there in July of 2019?

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

A. I don't recall putting anything in La Michoacana. I obeyed the instructions from the Judge, and I think that the Court has records that I removed everything that have to do with La Michoacana.

What I have noticed is that there are a lot of other businesses that have those freezers. It could be like markets, Walmarts, CVS --

- Q. Let me make this very clear. Are you saying that after the Judge issued his summary judgment order that you did not take a bunker from PLM and put it in your store with ice cream in it?
- 25 A. I didn't never authorized anyone to put any apparatus,

CROSS - LUIS MAESTRE any freezer in the store. I haven't signed any documents that 1 2 indicate that Luis Maestre is authorizing to put these in any 3 business. 4 So I'm just following the Court Orders. And I just, you 5 know, kept separate and apart, and I make sure I obey. 6 Was there an ice cream bunker marked "La Michoacana" in 7 your store in July 2019? July, sir. 8 (Repeating in Spanish.) INTERPRETER: 9 THE WITNESS: Not that I'm aware of. I had nothing 10 to do with that. Did you open a store called "Raspados Jalisco" of 50 --11 12 5015 North Tryon? 13 14

THE COURT: Mr. Anderson, I think this is way beyond the scope of direct.

MR. ANDERSON: Sir, it goes to the discussion that we were having that day.

THE COURT: You can ask him about a discussion on a phone, if you wish, but this goes beyond the scope of direct.

Ο. Did I ask --

THE COURT: The question you asked is what he had in the store, not what was discussed on the phone. If you want to ask him about discussions on the phone --

MR. ANDERSON: That's what I'm trying to get to.

THE COURT: Well, you're not getting to it. You're getting away from it.

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Q. (By Mr. Anderson) During our last discussion, did you say in English, that if you have ice cream in the store or it's being sold that I need to speak to PLM about it?

MS. CHAPMAN: Object to the form. Outside the

scope.

THE COURT: Overruled.

5

6

7

8

9

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE WITNESS: I don't know.

- Q. Did you tell me, you don't own the name. You can't do anything to me. I have no money.
- 10 A. That's a lie Anderson. I never told you that.
- 11 Q. Did you tell me you got to talk to the new owner of the 12 business. That you were not the owner of the business?
 - A. So I told him that I was not the owner of all these businesses that he was saying where he saw all these freezers.
 - Q. Did I ask you if you were intending to comply with the judgment to stop selling ice cream, and you indicated that you refused to sell stop selling ice cream featuring the La Michoacana marks as everyone else was doing it?
 - A. So what I told him is, "Anderson, I don't know what you're talking about. I know that there's a lot of businesses that have these refrigerators. I don't know anything about it."

He started to get upset. I told him stop calling me again regarding this because you're starting to get mad. And I think he stopped calling me after that.

- Q. Did you indicate, "Mr. Anderson, I don't care. You can't do nothing to me"?
 - A. That's false. You've caused a lot of hardship to me.
 - Q. Did you call me back after that discussion or was that
- 5 | it? We had one talk that day and that was it?
 - MS. CHAPMAN: Object to the question.
- 7 THE WITNESS: I don't remember.
- 8 THE COURT: Overruled.
- 9 | Q. Did I ask you if you were familiar with Leticia Adan?
- 10 A. I don't remember.

4

- 11 Q. Now, in your declaration that you submitted to court, did
- 12 you indicate that you had taken down all of the signage and
- 13 that you weren't using Michoacana anymore?
- 14 A. Yes. I removed everything. I was complying to with what
- 15 the Court ordered. Even before the Judge issued the Order, I
- 16 had already removed the signs from the business in Concord.
- 17 Q. So is it your contention that in July of 2019 there was
- 18 no freezer bunker in your store that had the Michoacana and
- 19 design on it?
- 20 A. As far as I can recall, no. I haven't signed any
- 21 authorization for any company to install anything with La
- 22 Michoacana.
- 23 Q. Is there someone else in charge of that business other
- 24 than you?
- 25 A. Female workers are there.

	1
	1
	2
	3
	4
	5
	6
	7
	8
	9
1	0
1	1
1	2
1	3
1	4
1	5
1	6
1	7
1	8
1	9
2	0
2	1
2	2
2	3
2	4

Q. Did one of the female workers install bunkers with freezers and ice cream in it in your store?

A. I don't think they've done it.

THE COURT: So we're on cross with respect to direct testimony on the telephone call interaction and the courthouse interaction. If you have any further questions on those two things you may ask him. But we're not here on any other substantive issues.

I guess what I'm saying is, I've let you go pretty far afield talking about compliance or non-compliance with the summary judgment order, but that's not the scope of direct.

MR. ANDERSON: I would ask that we suspend further cross until the conclusion of the next hearing. I would like to put on Rigoberto Fernandez at this time.

THE COURT: Do you have any other questions for this witness at this time?

MR. ANDERSON: Not that I'm prepared to deal with because this came up real quick.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. ANDERSON: What I need to get is the cell phone records --

THE COURT: If you're talking to me stand up.

MR. ANDERSON: I need to get the cell phone records of when he called me and when I called him. I need to get the documents that I can cross-examine him with, with respect

1 to 2 witn

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

THE COURT: Do you have any other questions of this witness at this time?

MR. ANDERSON: Not at this time.

THE COURT: Very well.

Mr. Maestre, you may step down.

All right. We've talked about the -- Mr. Maestre's testimony. We talked about procuring Ms. Garcia's testimony, and I've given you, Ms. Chapman, until March 27th to schedule with the Court Clerk a time for that.

MS. CHAPMAN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: If that can't be done, then I will deal with the issues on the record before me.

Mr. Anderson, I'll give you the same time period to file any telephone cell phone records you wish to file between now and March 27th.

I don't know that I have anything else in front of me except for Mr. Allan's motion to withdraw.

Do you care to be heard on that or submit anything?

MR. ALLAN: Your Honor, if you need detail, as
indicated in the motion, I prefer to do that in camera
affidavit to preserve attorney-client privilege.

THE COURT: All right. If you would do that.

MR. ALLAN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Is there anything else?

1 MS. CHAPMAN: No, Your Honor. 2 MR. ANDERSON: Yes, Your Honor. I'm prepared to 3 testify, and I also would like to call Rigoberto Fernandez 4 concerning the allegations that Mr. Maestre's made. 5 THE COURT: All right. So I've heard from you, both 6 in written form and in arguments to the Court. 7 MR. ANDERSON: But not as rebuttal to the testimony, 8 sir --THE COURT: If you're talking to me -- if you're 9 10 talking to me, stand up and respect the Court that you're 11 talking to. 12 I wanted to hear from Mr. Maestre personally because 13 I have not heard from him. I have heard from you. And so if 14 you would proffer to me what else you wish to testify about 15 that I haven't heard from you, I will be glad to hear from 16 you. 17 MR. ANDERSON: That I can demonstrate that he has 18 testified falsely, repeatedly throughout this case and just a 19 few minutes ago. And again, I can prove it. 20 I don't know what that means. THE COURT: 21 you have proffered to the Court facts that I've listened to. 22 And so I'm saying, what further evidence do you wish to 23 present to the Court on the issue before the Court? Not 24 whether Mr. Maestre has --25 MR. ANDERSON: His credibility is in question, sir.

THE COURT: It is in question. I've given you ample 1 2 opportunity to explore that. 3 MR. ANDERSON: And again, explore means to provide 4 refuting evidence, not just simply ask a few simple questions. 5 I don't watch much Perry Mason, but I've never seen 6 someone admit from the stand: "Yes, you just got me. 7 lied" and everything goes out the window. 8 See, the process is determining credibility by 9 comparison. 10 THE COURT: Thank you for explaining to the Court 11 the process. It's a very helpful thing for you to do. 12 This is not my first rodeo either, Mr. Anderson. 13 And I have been more than patient --14 MR. ANDERSON: I --15 THE COURT: Sit down. 16 I've been more than patient with your obstructive 17 conduct, your interrupting the Court, your badgering of 18 witnesses. I've given you more than ample opportunity to 19 cross-examine Mr. Maestre. I don't think any further evidence 20 is necessary on that point. 21 So, Ms. Chapman, I will wait to hear from you on 22 Ms. Garcia. 23 And we're concluded for the day. 24 MS. CHAPMAN: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. 25 THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. DeANTONIO: I have a question, Your Honor. Would you like us to reach out to the courtroom deputy about what we hear from Ms. Garcia? THE COURT: Yes. Mr. Allan, I'll take your motion under advisement, and when I receive your in-camera submission I will be able to rule on it. MR. ALLAN: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Very well. (The matter is concluded at 2:56.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER

I, Laura Andersen, Federal Official Court Reporter, in and for the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, do hereby certify that pursuant to Section 753, Title 28, United States Code that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the stenographically reported proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and that the transcript page format is in conformance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States.

S/Laura Andersen Laura Andersen, RMR Federal Official Court Reporter

Dated this the 4th day of March 2020.